Very interesting post. However, I want to note that we don't have to say that if I hadn't gotten the donut, the laws of nature would have been momentarily suspended in such a way that I would not have gotten the donut. We can instead say that the microscopic state of the world would have been different (all the way back to initial conditions of the universe if the laws are deterministic) in such a way that I wouldn't have gotten the donut. I know that this is somewhat counter-intuitive, but I find it more intuitive than saying that if I hadn't gotten the donut, the physical laws of nature would have been different. On a counterfactual theory of causation, this latter view implies that the actual laws of nature hold because I decided to get a donut, which doesn't sound right at all.
Lewis considers this possibility, but thinks it's ultimately less plausible. Because when we imagine counterfactuals, we imagine the world being the same up until a point. So what we'd need is for everything to be the same at the macroscopic level, with one stray atom out of place, making no difference at all to the overall course of events... right up until it makes a critical difference at the critical moment. Now perhaps that could happen, perhaps that's all consistent with the laws of nature. But is that always going to be possible, consistent with unchanging laws of nature, for every counterfactual we might contemplate? Surely not. So a divergence miracle it is.
It won't always be possible, because some counterfactuals have antecedents that are inconsistent with (or extremely unlikely under) the laws of nature. But many counterfactuals do have antecedents that are perfectly compatible with the laws, and for them, we don't need a miracle to bring the antecedent about. There is nothing about deciding not to get a donut that is in contradiction with the laws of nature.
We can't know that a priori. Perhaps there's no initial distribution of atoms shortly after the Big Bang such that (holding fixed the laws of nature) the course of events will be exactly the same in all macroscopic respects throughout all of human history right up until the point where I decide not to get a donut. Or perhaps there is! We have no way of knowing, is the point.
But this doesn't really detract from the larger point. Suppose we want to say that counterfactuals don't involve divergence miracles, but instead misplaced atoms that don't make a difference at all up until the point when they do. Then when we're asking whether or not I could have chosen otherwise, we're holding fixed the laws but allowing ourselves to vary the initial conditions in such a way that the misplaced atom will bubble up right at the point where I'm choosing whether to have my donut. And we're assuming that could happen. So even if laws are deterministic, I could have chosen otherwise. We have libertarian free will even in a deterministic world.
I agree we don't know for sure if there is an initial condition of the universe that reproduces almost all of the macroscopic events of the past and leads to not getting a donut. In my view, what we need in order to say that the laws would not have changed is that the probability that I do not get a donut, conditional on the macroscopic events of the past occurring and the laws staying the same, is high enough. But that is because I tend to favor an analysis of counterfactuals based on probabilities of the kind Alan Hajek as been pushing. I agree that it's different if someone adopts Lewis' theory. (But what is such a person supposed to do? How are they supposed to assess if there is a world with the desired initial conditions? And how are they supposed to assess if there is world where the laws are different? I for one believe in only one world.)
I also agree about the larger point about free will.
Thank you for writing such a good defense of compatibilism. I agree with nearly everything you wrote, and yet...
I still don’t believe in free will, and I think compatibilism, not determinism, is the trivial perspective.
Yes, we can play with counterfactuals, and learn from them. Counterfactual thinking and free volition (to distinguish from free will) are critical parts of the matrix of determinism.
But whether or not you eat a donut, with or without a gun to your head, is not the important aspect of determinism. Much more important is the question of whether you have a say in going to hell for all eternity or not...
Consider how many people there are in the world who believe that they will be eternally punished or rewarded for the choices they make.
It makes a huge difference to them if they learn that they and the people they care about couldn’t actually do otherwise. Determinism changes the identity of God and challenges his omnipotence and benevolence. It changes people’s calculations and motivations for doing good and bad things.
Whether or not we believe in libertarian free will changes how we feel about how people treat us, and how quick we are to forgive.
In my opinion, the determinism that is conceded in compatibilism is not trivial at all. It is a huge deal that most people haven’t yet taken onboard, and it has enormous practical, social, and psychological consequences.
The moral dimension is the whole ballgame, and the rest is mostly curiosa – a bit of a semantic game of mostly academic interest, that clouds the larger issues by confusing the language.
What's at stake between the compatibilist and determinist (or in the freewill debate as a whole) if one doesn't believe in universal, objective moral values, given how often the concern is the implication for moral responsibility?
The existence of free will may have moral implications, but the question is not essentially a moral one. (Compare: the question of what sorts of things make people happy is a question with moral implications, but it's a moral question, not a psychological one.) My concern here is with the "metaphysical problem of free will," not the "moral problem of free will."
Very interesting post. However, I want to note that we don't have to say that if I hadn't gotten the donut, the laws of nature would have been momentarily suspended in such a way that I would not have gotten the donut. We can instead say that the microscopic state of the world would have been different (all the way back to initial conditions of the universe if the laws are deterministic) in such a way that I wouldn't have gotten the donut. I know that this is somewhat counter-intuitive, but I find it more intuitive than saying that if I hadn't gotten the donut, the physical laws of nature would have been different. On a counterfactual theory of causation, this latter view implies that the actual laws of nature hold because I decided to get a donut, which doesn't sound right at all.
Lewis considers this possibility, but thinks it's ultimately less plausible. Because when we imagine counterfactuals, we imagine the world being the same up until a point. So what we'd need is for everything to be the same at the macroscopic level, with one stray atom out of place, making no difference at all to the overall course of events... right up until it makes a critical difference at the critical moment. Now perhaps that could happen, perhaps that's all consistent with the laws of nature. But is that always going to be possible, consistent with unchanging laws of nature, for every counterfactual we might contemplate? Surely not. So a divergence miracle it is.
It won't always be possible, because some counterfactuals have antecedents that are inconsistent with (or extremely unlikely under) the laws of nature. But many counterfactuals do have antecedents that are perfectly compatible with the laws, and for them, we don't need a miracle to bring the antecedent about. There is nothing about deciding not to get a donut that is in contradiction with the laws of nature.
We can't know that a priori. Perhaps there's no initial distribution of atoms shortly after the Big Bang such that (holding fixed the laws of nature) the course of events will be exactly the same in all macroscopic respects throughout all of human history right up until the point where I decide not to get a donut. Or perhaps there is! We have no way of knowing, is the point.
But this doesn't really detract from the larger point. Suppose we want to say that counterfactuals don't involve divergence miracles, but instead misplaced atoms that don't make a difference at all up until the point when they do. Then when we're asking whether or not I could have chosen otherwise, we're holding fixed the laws but allowing ourselves to vary the initial conditions in such a way that the misplaced atom will bubble up right at the point where I'm choosing whether to have my donut. And we're assuming that could happen. So even if laws are deterministic, I could have chosen otherwise. We have libertarian free will even in a deterministic world.
I agree we don't know for sure if there is an initial condition of the universe that reproduces almost all of the macroscopic events of the past and leads to not getting a donut. In my view, what we need in order to say that the laws would not have changed is that the probability that I do not get a donut, conditional on the macroscopic events of the past occurring and the laws staying the same, is high enough. But that is because I tend to favor an analysis of counterfactuals based on probabilities of the kind Alan Hajek as been pushing. I agree that it's different if someone adopts Lewis' theory. (But what is such a person supposed to do? How are they supposed to assess if there is a world with the desired initial conditions? And how are they supposed to assess if there is world where the laws are different? I for one believe in only one world.)
I also agree about the larger point about free will.
Thank you for writing such a good defense of compatibilism. I agree with nearly everything you wrote, and yet...
I still don’t believe in free will, and I think compatibilism, not determinism, is the trivial perspective.
Yes, we can play with counterfactuals, and learn from them. Counterfactual thinking and free volition (to distinguish from free will) are critical parts of the matrix of determinism.
But whether or not you eat a donut, with or without a gun to your head, is not the important aspect of determinism. Much more important is the question of whether you have a say in going to hell for all eternity or not...
Consider how many people there are in the world who believe that they will be eternally punished or rewarded for the choices they make.
It makes a huge difference to them if they learn that they and the people they care about couldn’t actually do otherwise. Determinism changes the identity of God and challenges his omnipotence and benevolence. It changes people’s calculations and motivations for doing good and bad things.
Whether or not we believe in libertarian free will changes how we feel about how people treat us, and how quick we are to forgive.
In my opinion, the determinism that is conceded in compatibilism is not trivial at all. It is a huge deal that most people haven’t yet taken onboard, and it has enormous practical, social, and psychological consequences.
The moral dimension is the whole ballgame, and the rest is mostly curiosa – a bit of a semantic game of mostly academic interest, that clouds the larger issues by confusing the language.
What's at stake between the compatibilist and determinist (or in the freewill debate as a whole) if one doesn't believe in universal, objective moral values, given how often the concern is the implication for moral responsibility?
The existence of free will may have moral implications, but the question is not essentially a moral one. (Compare: the question of what sorts of things make people happy is a question with moral implications, but it's a moral question, not a psychological one.) My concern here is with the "metaphysical problem of free will," not the "moral problem of free will."